
**Information technology — Security
techniques — Entity authentication —
Part 3:
Mechanisms using digital signature
techniques**

AMENDMENT 1

*Technologies de l'information — Techniques de sécurité —
Authentification d'entité —*

Partie 3: Mécanismes utilisant des techniques de signature numériques

AMENDEMENT 1

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Case postale 56 • CH-1211 Geneva 20
Tel. + 41 22 749 01 11
Fax + 41 22 749 09 47
E-mail copyright@iso.org
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Published in Switzerland

Foreword

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International Standards are drafted in accordance with the rules given in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

The main task of the joint technical committee is to prepare International Standards. Draft International Standards adopted by the joint technical committee are circulated to national bodies for voting. Publication as an International Standard requires approval by at least 75 % of the national bodies casting a vote.

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Amendment 1 to ISO/IEC 9798-3:1998 was prepared by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, *Information technology*, Subcommittee SC 27, *IT Security techniques*.

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Information technology — Security techniques — Entity authentication —

Part 3: Mechanisms using digital signature techniques

AMENDMENT 1

Page 1, Clause 3

Replace the first paragraph of Clause 3 with the following:

For the purposes of this part of ISO/IEC 9798, the definitions and notation described in ISO/IEC 9798-1 and the following apply:

I_A The identity of entity A , which is either A or Cert A .

I_B The identity of entity B , which is either B or Cert B .

Res X The result of verifying entity X 's public key or public key certificate.

Page 5, 5.2.3

Add the following after 5.2.3:

6 Mechanisms involving an on-line trusted third party

6.1 Introduction

The authentication mechanisms in this clause require the two entities A and B to validate each other's public keys using an on-line trusted third party (with distinguishing identifier TP). This trusted third party shall possess reliable copies of the public keys of A and B . The entities A and B shall possess a reliable copy of the public key of TP .

This clause specifies two five pass authentication mechanisms, both of which achieve mutual authentication between entities A and B .

In the specification of the two mechanisms, the form of tokens and text fields follow the description given at the beginning of Clause 5, i.e. all paragraphs in Clause 5 before 5.1.

Implementations of the mechanisms shall use one of the signature schemes specified in ISO/IEC 14888 or ISO/IEC 9796.

6.2 Five pass authentication (initiated by A)

In this authentication mechanism, uniqueness/timeliness is controlled by generating and checking a random number (see Annex B of ISO/IEC 9798-1:1997).

This authentication mechanism is illustrated in Figure 6.




Figure 6 — Five pass authentication (initiated by A)

The tokens shall be created according to one of the following two options.

Option 1:

$$\text{TokenAB} = \text{Text9} || \text{ResA} || sS_{\tau}(R_B || \text{ResA} || \text{Text5}) || sS_A(R_B || R_A || B || A || \text{Text8})$$

$$\text{TokenBA} = R_A || R_B || \text{Text3} || sS_B(B || R_A || R_B || A || \text{Text2})$$

$$\text{TokenTA} = \text{ResA} || \text{ResB} || sS_{\tau}(R'_A || \text{ResB} || \text{Text6}) || sS_{\tau}(R_B || \text{ResA} || \text{Text5})$$

Option 2:

$$\text{TokenAB} = R'_A || \text{Text9} || \text{TokenTA} || sS_A(R_B || R_A || B || A || \text{Text8})$$

$$\text{TokenBA} = R_A || R_B || \text{Text3} || sS_B(B || R_A || R_B || A || \text{Text2})$$

$$\text{TokenTA} = \text{ResA} || \text{ResB} || sS_{\tau}(R'_A || R_B || \text{ResA} || \text{ResB} || \text{Text5})$$

The values of the fields I_A , I_B , ResA, ResB, Status and Failure shall have the following forms:

$$I_A = A \text{ or } \text{CertA}$$

$$I_B = B \text{ or } \text{CertB}$$

$$\text{ResA} = (\text{CertA} || \text{Status}), (A || P_A) \text{ or } \text{Failure}$$

$$\text{ResB} = (\text{CertB} || \text{Status}), (B || P_B) \text{ or } \text{Failure}$$

Status = True or False. The value of the field shall be set to False if the certificate is known to have been revoked; otherwise it shall be set to True.

Failure: ResX (where $X = \{A, B\}$) will be set to Failure if neither a public key nor a certificate of entity X can be found by TP.

In the mechanism, if TP knows the mapping between identity X and P_X (where $X = \{A, B\}$), then it shall set $I_X = X$; otherwise, it shall set $I_X = \text{CertX}$, and X shall be set equal to the collection of distinguished identity fields in CertX. If either X or CertX is permitted to be used as an identity, then there should be a pre-arranged means to allow TP to distinguish the two types of identity indications. The value of ResX (where $X = \{A, B\}$) shall be determined according to Table 1.

Table 1 — Value of ResX

Field	Choice 1	Choice 2
I_X	X	CertX
ResX	$(X P_X)$ or Failure	$(\text{CertX} \text{Status})$ or Failure

The mechanism is performed as follows:

- 1) A sends a random number R_A , its identity I_A and, optionally, a text field Text1 to B.
- 2) B sends the token TokenBA and I_B to A.
- 3) A sends a random number R'_A , together with R_B , I_A , I_B and, optionally, a text field Text4 to TP.
- 4) On receipt of the message in Step (3) from A, TP performs the following steps. If $I_A = A$ and $I_B = B$, TP retrieves P_A and P_B ; if $I_A = \text{CertA}$ and $I_B = \text{CertB}$, TP checks the validity of CertA and CertB. The process of certificate verification by TP may require protection from denial-of-service attacks. The specification of mechanisms to be used to provide such protection is outside of the scope of this part of ISO/IEC 9798.
- 5) Then TP sends TokenTA and, optionally, a text field Text7 to A. The fields ResA and ResB in TokenTA shall be: the certificates of A and B and their status, the distinguishing identifiers of A and B and their public keys, or an indication of Failure.
- 6) On receipt of the message in Step (5) from TP, A performs the following steps:
 - (i) Verify TokenTA by checking the signature of TP contained in the token, and by checking that the random number R'_A , sent to TP in Step (3), is the same as the random number R'_A contained in the signed data of TokenTA.
 - (ii) Retrieve the public key of B from the message, verify TokenBA received in Step (2) by checking the signature of B contained in the token and checking that the value of identifier field (A) in the signed data of TokenBA is equal to A's distinguishing identifier, and then check that the random number R_A , sent to B in Step (1), is the same as the random number R_A contained in TokenBA.
- 7) A sends TokenAB to B.
- 8) On receipt of the message in Step (7) from A, B performs the following steps:
 - (i) Verify TokenTA by checking the signature of TP contained in the token, and by checking that the random number R_B , sent to A in Step (2), is the same as the random number R_B contained in the signed data of TokenTA.

- (ii) Retrieve the public key of *A* from the message, verify *TokenAB* by checking the signature of *A* contained in the token and checking that the value of identifier field (*B*) in the signed data of *TokenAB* is equal to *B*'s distinguishing identifier, and then check that the random number R_B contained in the signed data of *TokenAB* is equal to the random number R_B sent to *A* in Step (2).

6.3 Five pass authentication (initiated by *B*)

In this authentication mechanism, uniqueness/timeliness is controlled by generating and checking a random number (see Annex B of ISO/IEC 9798-1).

This authentication mechanism is illustrated in Figure 7.




Figure 7 — Five pass authentication (initiated by *B*)

The tokens shall be created according to one of the following two options.

Option 1:

$$\text{TokenAB} = \text{Text7} || R_A || \text{ResA} || sS_T(R_B || \text{ResA} || \text{Text3}) || sS_A(R_B || R_A || B || A || \text{Text6})$$

$$\text{TokenBA} = R_A || R_B || \text{Text9} || sS_B(A || R_A || R_B || B || \text{Text8})$$

$$\text{TokenTA} = \text{ResA} || \text{ResB} || sS_T(R'_A || \text{ResB} || \text{Text4}) || sS_T(R_B || \text{ResA} || \text{Text3})$$

Option 2:

$$\text{TokenAB} = R'_A || \text{Text7} || \text{TokenTA} || sS_A(R_B || R_A || B || A || \text{Text6})$$

$$\text{TokenBA} = R_A || R_B || \text{Text9} || sS_B(R_A || R_B || A || B || \text{Text8})$$

$$\text{TokenTA} = \text{ResA} || \text{ResB} || sS_T(R'_A || R_B || \text{ResA} || \text{ResB} || \text{Text3})$$

The values of the fields I_A , I_B , *ResA*, *ResB*, *Status* and *Failure* shall have the following forms:

$$I_A = A \text{ or } \text{CertA}$$

$I_B = B$ or $\text{Cert}B$

$\text{Res}A = (\text{Cert}A||\text{Status}), (A||P_A)$ or Failure

$\text{Res}B = (\text{Cert}B||\text{Status}), (B||P_B)$ or Failure

Status = True or False. The value of the field shall be set to False if the certificate is known to have been revoked; otherwise it shall be set to True.

Failure: $\text{Res}Y$ (where $Y = \{A, B\}$) will be set to Failure if neither a public key nor a certificate of entity Y can be found by TP .

In the mechanism, if TP knows the mapping between identity Y and P_Y (where $Y = \{A, B\}$), then it shall set $I_Y = Y$; otherwise, it shall set $I_Y = \text{Cert}Y$, and Y shall be set equal to the collection of distinguished identity fields in $\text{Cert}Y$. If either Y or $\text{Cert}Y$ is permitted to be used as an identity, then there should be a pre-arranged means to allow TP to distinguish the two types of identity indications. The value of $\text{Res}Y$ (where $Y = \{A, B\}$) shall be determined according to Table 2.

Table 2 — Value of Res Y

Field	Choice 1	Choice 2
I_Y	Y	$\text{Cert}Y$
$\text{Res}Y$	$(Y P_Y)$ or Failure	$(\text{Cert}Y \text{Status})$ or Failure

The mechanism is performed as follows:

- 1) B sends a random number R_B , its identity I_B and, optionally, a text field $\text{Text}1$ to A .
- 2) A sends a random number R'_A , together with R_B , I_A , I_B and, optionally, a text field $\text{Text}2$ to TP .
- 3) On receipt of the message in Step (2) from A , TP performs the following steps. If $I_A = A$ and $I_B = B$, TP retrieves P_A and P_B ; if $I_A = \text{Cert}A$ and $I_B = \text{Cert}B$, TP checks the validity of $\text{Cert}A$ and $\text{Cert}B$. The process of certificate verification by TP may require protection from denial-of-service attacks. The specification of mechanisms to be used to provide such protection is outside of the scope of this part of ISO/IEC 9798.
- 4) Then TP sends $\text{Token}TA$ and, optionally, a text field $\text{Text}5$ to A . The fields $\text{Res}A$ and $\text{Res}B$ in $\text{Token}TA$ shall be: the certificates of A and B and their status, the distinguishing identifiers of A and B and their public keys or an indication of Failure.
- 5) A sends the token $\text{Token}AB$ and I_A to B .
- 6) On receipt of the message in Step (5) from A , B performs the following steps:
 - (i) Verify the signature of TP in $\text{Token}AB$ by checking the signature of TP contained in the token, and by checking that the random number R_B , sent to A in Step (1), is the same as the random number R_B contained in the signed data of TP of $\text{Token}AB$.
 - (ii) Retrieve the public key of A from the message, verify $\text{Token}AB$ by checking the signature of A contained in the token and checking that the value of identifier field (B) in the signed data of $\text{Token}AB$ is equal to B 's distinguishing identifier, and then check that the random number R_B , sent to A in Step (1), is the same as the random number R_B contained in the signed data of A of $\text{Token}AB$.
- 7) B sends $\text{Token}BA$ to A .

- 8) On receipt of the message in Step (7) from *B*, *A* performs the following steps:
- (i) Verify *TokenTA* by checking the signature of *TP* contained in the token, and by checking that the random number R'_A , sent to *TP* in Step (2), is the same as the random number R'_A contained in the signed data of *TokenTA*.
 - (ii) Retrieve the public key of *B* from the message, verify *TokenBA* by checking the signature of *B* contained in the token and checking that the value of identifier field (*A*) in the signed data of *TokenBA* is equal to *A*'s distinguishing identifier, and then check that the random number R_A contained in the signed data of *TokenBA* is equal to the random number R_A sent to *B* in Step (5).

Page 6, Annex A

Replace the first sentence of Annex A with the following:

The tokens specified in Clause 5 and Clause 6 contain text fields.

Page 6

Add the following after Annex A:

Annex B

(normative)

Object Identifiers and ASN.1 Syntax

B.1 Formal definition

EntityAuthenticationMechanisms-3 (4)

```
iso(1) standard(0) e-auth-mechanisms(9798) part3(3)
asn1-module(0) object-identifiers(0) }
```

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN

-- EXPORTS All; --

-- IMPORTS None; --

OID ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- alias

-- Synonyms --

is9798-3 OID ::= { iso(1) standard(0) e-auth-mechanisms(9798) part3(3) }

mechanism OID ::= { is9798-3 mechanisms(1) }

-- mechanisms not involving a trusted third party --

ua-one-pass OID ::= { mechanism 1 }

ua-two-pass OID ::= { mechanism 2 }

```

ma-two-pass OID ::= { mechanism 3 }

ma-three-pass OID ::= { mechanism 4 }

ma-two-pass-Parallel OID ::= { mechanism 5 }

-- mechanisms involving a trusted third party --

ttp-ma-five-pass-by-A OID ::= { mechanism 6 }

ttp-ma-five-pass-by-B OID ::= { mechanism 7 }

END -- EntityAuthenticationMechanisms-3 -

```

B.2 Use of subsequent object identifiers

Immediately after an object identifier identifying the mechanism, another object identifier that identifies a digital signature algorithm shall follow (i.e., one of the algorithms specified in ISO/IEC 14888 or ISO/IEC 9796).

B.3 Coding examples in accordance with the basic encoding

In accordance with ISO/IEC 8825-1, an object identifier consists of one or more series of octets. Each series encodes a number.

- Bit 8 (the most significant bit) is set equal to zero in the last octet of a series and to one in the previous octets, if there is more than one octet.
- The concatenation of bits 7 to 1 of the octets of a series encodes a number. Each number shall be encoded on the fewest possible octets, that is, the octet '80' is invalid in the first position of a series.
- The first number is the number of the standard; the second number, if present, is the part in a multi-part standard.

An object identifier may refer to any mechanism defined in this part of ISO/IEC 9798.

- For identifying an ISO standard, the first octet is set equal to '28', i.e., 40 in decimal (see ISO/IEC 8825-1).
- The next two octets are set equal to 'CC46'. 9798 is equal to '2646' in hexadecimal, i.e., 0010 0110 0100 0110, i.e., two blocks of seven bits: 1001100 1000110. After insertion of the appropriate value of bit 8 in each octet, the coding of the series is therefore 11001100 01000110, i.e., 'CC46'.
- The next octet is set equal to '03' for identifying part 3.
- The next octet identifies an authentication mechanism.
 - '01' identifies the one-pass unilateral authentication mechanism not involving an on-line trusted third party.
 - '02' identifies the two-pass unilateral authentication mechanism not involving an on-line trusted third party.
 - '03' identifies the two-pass mutual authentication mechanism not involving an on-line trusted third party.